The world is gambling a significant part of its industrial, technological, and energy future on something as seemingly insignificant as... critical mineralsThey are the invisible building blocks that make possible everything from electric car batteries to wind turbine magnets, advanced chips, and the most sophisticated defense systems.
Although most people have barely heard of them, their impact on the economy and geopolitics is already enormous. These materials are considered critical when several factors converge: high demand, difficulty in replacing them, concentration of production in a few countries, and a real risk of supply chain disruptionsThat combination has transformed lithium, cobaltTungsten or rare earth elements are key pieces in an increasingly tense global chessboard.
What are critical minerals and why do they matter so much to Europe?
When we talk about critical minerals in Europe, we are not referring to a technological whim, but to materials without which The energy transition and digitalization simply don't add up.Solar panels, batteries for electric vehicles, permanent magnets for wind turbines, smart grids or data centers depend on an ever-growing list of strategic elements.
That list includes familiar names, such as lithium, nickel, cobalt or copperAnd others less well-known but equally crucial: gallium, germanium, niobium, natural graphite, and the famous rare earth elements. Many of these are also essential for the defense and aerospace industries, from electronically scanned array radars to missile guidance systems and tank armor.
The big problem for the European Union is that The extraction and, above all, the refining of these minerals are heavily concentrated outside their territory.with China as the dominant player. Beijing not only leads the mining of several of these raw materials, but also controls around 90% of rare earth processing, a very significant portion of cobalt, and a large fraction of the lithium and graphite consumed worldwide.
This means that a simple regulatory change in a third country can leave European industry without essential parts for manufacturing everything from a car to a strategic communications system. That's why Brussels is now speaking openly about risk of economic coercion and vulnerabilities that directly affect security.
The International Energy Agency has also been warning that global demand for some of these materials is set to skyrocket: Lithium needed for electric vehicles and stationary storage could to triple by 2030 and quadruple around 2040Meanwhile, the consumption of nickel, cobalt, graphite or rare earth elements is already growing at rates of between 6% and 8% annually.
Europe is on the move: from the Critical Raw Materials Act to the ReSourceEU strategy
Faced with this scenario, the European Union has stopped looking the other way. First, it approved the Critical Raw Materials Act (CRMA), with which it has set clear objectives for 2030 regarding extraction, refining and recycling within the bloc, and identified projects considered strategic to reduce external dependence.
On this basis, Brussels has now presented the strategy ReSourceEU, designed specifically to reduce exposure to China and other dominant suppliers. The plan rests on two main pillars: the creation of a European Centre for Strategic Raw Materials and a common storage system for critical minerals starting in 2026.
The new center will have the task of coordinating joint purchases for Member States, aligning business demand with industrial needs and preventing each country from negotiating independently. In parallel, the EU will launch a common area of safety stock of critical metals, a kind of strategic reserve for times of supply stress.
Brussels has already reserved at least 3.000 million euros in European funds for next year, with the aim of unlocking urgent investments in three key value chains: permanent magnets, batteries, and defense. This money must support extraction, refining, and recycling projects within the EU, with particular attention to materials such as copper, rare earth, niobium, nickel, lithium, phosphate or graphite.
The Commission is also preparing restrictions on the export of scrap metal and waste rich in critical minerals, such as permanent magnets at the end of their useful life, and reserves the option of adopting specific measures for metals such as aluminum or copper. The objective is clear: to keep valuable material within Europe to drive a true circular economy of strategic metals.
Dependence on China and the new geopolitics of minerals
The concern in Europe is not theoretical. China has demonstrated in recent years that it is willing to use its dominance in certain supply chains as a tool of pressure, restricting exports of gallium, germanium, or antimony in response to technological decisions by the United States and its allies.
These seemingly minor materials are essential for manufacturing advanced semiconductors, radar systems, fiber optics, or special alloys used in defense. As soon as Beijing tightened the supply, prices skyrocketed, and many Western companies were forced to seek alternative suppliers, even resorting to intermediaries in third countries to circumvent controls. More details on how Beijing is tightening its controls can be found in the analysis on controls on the export of rare earth elements.
In this context, high-ranking European officials such as the High Representative for Foreign Affairs, Kaja Kallas, have warned that Excessive dependencies can become physically dangerous. when they affect critical supplies for defense or strategic infrastructure. Hence the insistent message from Brussels: companies must stop buying 100% of certain inputs from a single country.
Other Western partners have already taken decisive steps. The United States has redirected some of its industrial legislation to mobilize defense funds toward the creation of strategic mineral reserves and the strengthening of its industrial base for critical materials. NATO, for its part, approved a roadmap to secure essential defense supply chains, which includes identifying key raw materials, studying risks, promoting recycling, and recommending secure storage facilities.
Europe is trying not to fall behind, but it starts somewhat late and strong internal fragmentationEach member state has its own mining regulations, permitting timeframes, and social debate on new extraction projects, which can easily take more than a decade.
Spain: geological potential and lack of a unified strategy
In this European debate, Spain occupies a unique position. It is not a major global mining power, but it does have relevant geological resources of critical minerals and has been identified by Brussels as one of the countries destined to play an important role in the new raw materials policy.
The most emblematic case is that of tungsten or wolframIron, a metal of extremely high hardness and a very high melting point, is essential for industrial tools, armor plating, and certain types of ammunition. Spain has a historical background in its extraction, especially in Galicia, Extremadura and Castile and LeónAnd today it remains a coveted material for both civilian and military use.
But it's not the only one. There is also a presence of other things in the Spanish subsoil. lithium, tin, copper, platinum group elements, cobalt or nickelAmong others, some deposits that were abandoned due to a lack of profitability are now being re-examined in light of new prices and the needs of the energy transition. Several lithium projects in Extremadura and new tungsten and copper developments are undergoing environmental assessments and intense public debate.
The great paradox is that, while the European Union has already identified seven projects located in Spain as strategic For the continent's independence in raw materials, the country still lacks a clear and unified state vision regarding the role of these resources in its national security. Governance is divided among various ministries with often divergent priorities: environment, industry, energy, science…
This fragmentation has been described by experts as a "out-of-tune orchestra": disconnected plans, long processing times, social rejection in some territories and the absence of a common narrative that explains why these projects are not just an economic or local issue, but a matter of strategic interest for the whole country.
Critical Minerals and National Security: The TESIS Proposal for Spain
From this diagnosis, a much broader approach has emerged: TESIS doctrine (Strategic Land of Security, Industry and Supplies)This is not a classic mining plan, but a way of integrating mineral resources directly into National Security policy.
The starting point is to recognize something that is already included in the text itself. 2024 National Security Annual ReportSpain's high dependence on critical raw materials and the fragility of global supply chains represent a vulnerability. However, this recognition has not yet translated into a comprehensive strategy comparable to that of other allies.
Thesis proposes a conceptual leap: the strategic deposits present in Spanish territory and the reserves of certain metals should be considered National Security Assets and Propertynot just economic assets. That would imply protecting its management from short-term interests, jurisdictional disputes, or political shifts, and planning them with an eye toward resilience in the coming decades.
In practice, the doctrine proposes a multi-level architecture: one mineral intelligence cell that acts as a "radar" for geopolitical and market risks; a Interministerial Board of Strategic Resources linked to the National Security Council to coordinate policies; and a National Strategic Reserve of already processed minerals, ready to be used by industry and defense in case of a supply crisis.
Mineral intelligence and governance: moving from diagnosis to action
The first pillar of this approach is what specialists call Mineral IntelligenceIt's not just about monitoring price trends or extraction volumes, but about combining geopolitical analysis, technological monitoring, logistical tracking, and risk assessment across the entire value chain.
A cell dedicated to this task, integrated into the Department of Homeland SecurityIt could receive information from intelligence services, trade offices abroad, geological organizations or research centers, and translate it into early warnings for the Government: from a regulatory change in a producing country to stockpiling movements of inventories by large state actors.
The second pillar is to correct the current "out-of-tune orchestra" through a high-level inter-ministerial committee This body would set priorities and coordinate the various lists of critical minerals managed by the Ministries of Defense, Ecological Transition, Industry, Digital Transformation, and Science. This working group, supported by mineral intelligence, could define which materials are critical for each area and what tools to apply in each case.
Similar models already exist in the United States, where agencies such as Department of Energy, the Department of Defense or Department of the Interior They work with their own lists, although a lack of coordination has been identified there as a problem. The idea for Spain is avoid that fragmentation with a clear political leadership.
In parallel, TESIS proposes using the regulations of protection of critical infrastructure to consider as such certain deposits and processing plants located on Spanish soil, so that they have reinforced protocols against sabotage, hybrid attacks or cyber threats.
Towards a "mineral shield": reserves, diplomacy and talent
The creation of one National Strategic Reserve of Minerals This would be the most visible part of this "mineral shield." It wouldn't involve storing raw ore, but rather refined metals, ready for use in critical industrial processes. Priority would be given to materials with a high risk of scarcity, strong geographic concentration, and few short-term alternatives, such as tungsten, antimony, certain types of heavy rare earth elements, gallium, germanium, and processed cobalt.
In parallel, a active mineral diplomacy, involving the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Defense, and the Ministry of Industry, to participate in initiatives such as the Minerals Security Partnership, promote alliances with reliable producing countries and support responsible investment projects in third countries.
Another fundamental aspect would be the reinforcement of the circular economy of metals: develop a powerful recycling industry for batteries, magnets, electronic components or defense equipment at the end of their useful life, so that part of the demand is met without the need for new extraction.
All of this also requires a change in professional culture. Experts emphasize the need to train professionals with diverse backgrounds, capable of working across geology, mining engineering, raw materials economics, strategic intelligence, and public communication. the so-called "mineral geopolitics"Without people capable of translating technical issues into political decisions and explaining them to society, the best strategies risk remaining just on paper.
In that sense, the divulgation It plays a significant role. Raising awareness about what lies behind a mobile phone, an electric car, or a wind turbine, what jobs the mineral value chain generates, and what the associated environmental and social challenges are, is key to attracting young talent to geology, materials engineering, or mining research, and also to building the so-called "social license to operate" in the territories.
Critical minerals beyond Europe: global opportunities and risks
While Europe tries to catch up, other regions are multiplying strategies around critical minerals. Brazil It is presented as a strategic platform for producing and exporting these materials, supported by specialized investment funds that seek to take advantage of its potential for copper, niobium, nickel, lithium, phosphate or graphite under responsible mining criteria and ESG standards.
La UNCTAD He insists, for his part, that developing countries should not limit themselves to extracting and exporting raw minerals. His proposal involves creating new public-private partnerships that allow for the expansion of refining and processing within these countries and, above all, connect mining with other economic sectors: manufacturing, services, technology, logistics.
The UN agency argues that the real leap forward occurs when they are woven forward and backward links in the value chain: local equipment suppliers, industries that use those metals to manufacture higher value-added goods, applied research centers, and regional networks that share infrastructure and investments. These dynamics are part of the boom in critical metals mining and its global challenges.
In this context, regions such as Africa Southeast Asia has become the stage for growing competition among major powers. The United States, China, and, to a lesser extent, Russia are vying to secure positions in lithium, cobalt, copper, and rare earth projects. The European Union is trying not to be left behind, as demonstrated by its recent push for agreements with the African Union to collaborate on supply chains for strategic and critical minerals.
Specific European countries are making their own moves. ItalyFor example, it is studying, through its large state-owned energy company, ENI, investments in recycling and refining of critical mineralswith an eye on Canada and South America. The stated objective is to reduce the strategic gap in the energy transition and not depend exclusively on large external players.
Companies and the energy transition: from solar panels to tanks
Alongside public initiatives, large private groups are repositioning their businesses around these materials. The energy transition, the electrification of transport, mass digitalization, and increased defense spending are resulting in a new wave of mining and processing projects in different regions of the world.
Many of the technologies expected to grow in the coming years are closely linked to a handful of chemical elements: lithium-ion batteries, photovoltaic panels, wind turbines, data centers, stationary storage systems…all of them depend on lithium, cobalt, nickel, graphite, rare earth elements or copper, among others.
Demand for lithium rose by around 30% in the last year And the production of other minerals such as nickel, cobalt, graphite, and rare earth elements grew between 6% and 8%, driven by the surge in electric vehicles, battery storage, and the deployment of renewable energy. Projections indicate that the market value of the production of these minerals could multiply by 1,5 by 2040.
At the same time, sectors such as defense and to maximise security and your enjoyment. They are increasing their consumption of strategic materials. Tanks, state-of-the-art fighter jets, and frigates equipped with advanced radars concentrate significant quantities of tungsten, cobalt, rare earth elements, and gallium in their armor, engines, sensors, and electronic systems.
This intersection of climatic, technological, and safety requirements means that each ton of a given mineral now has a much greater geopolitical weight which was just two decades ago. And it forces us to rethink how supply chains are designed, what role Europe plays in them, and what real room for maneuver countries like Spain have.
The global struggle for critical minerals has gone from being a technical issue for specialists to being at the center of the political, economic and security agenda. Europe is taking steps to strengthen its autonomy With laws, purchasing centers, reserves, and alliances, Spain is debating how to leverage its promising subsoil while prioritizing environmental protection and social acceptance. Meanwhile, in the rest of the world, from Brazil to Africa and Canada, strategies are multiplying to ensure these resources drive not only exports but also industrial development. What happens in the coming years with lithium, cobalt, tungsten, rare earth elements, and copper will largely determine each region's position in the green and digital economy of the 21st century.
